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containing contraband, and thus warranted cree on basis of mutual mistake when he 
placing petitioner under arrest. subsequently received assessment for fed-
The circumstantial prima facie case pre-
sented by the prosecution suggests no rea-
son j usti fying denial of an opportunity for 
petitioner to explain at trial, if he chooses 
to do so, how his airplane ticket came to be 
in a bag containing marijuana. The su-
perior court denied the motion to suppress 
evidence, and the Court of Appeal denied 
an extraordinary writ. Issuance by this 
court of a peremptory writ directing the 
superior court to suppress the paper bag and 
its marijuana contents is unjustified. 
McCOMB and BURKE, JJ., concur. 
Rehearing denied; McCOMB, MOSK 
md BURKE, JJ., dissenting. 
• 
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Betty Rlchwhlle KULCHAR, Plalnllff 
and Appellant, 
Y. 
George Victor KULCHAR, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
S. F.22695. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In 'Bank. 
Dec. 23, 1969. 
Divorced husband sought modifica':' 
tion of interlocutory decree of ,divorce to 
relieve him of liability to pay federal in-
come taxes assessed against parties on 
income accruing to wife in New Zealand. 
The Superior Court, San Mateo County, 
Wayne R. Millington, J., entered judg-
ment for husband and wife appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J., held that 
where both husband ,and wife knew of 
New Zealand assets but husband and his 
attorney chose not to investigate their tax-
ability ,although property settlement agree-
ment expressly required husband to hold 
wife harmless as to any monies due any 
taxing agency, husband was not entitled 
to have tax provision struck from the de-
462 P.2d-2 
eral taxes on theretofore undisclosed in-
come accumulated during marriage by New 
Zealand corporation in wife's name. 
Reversed. 
McComb, J., dissented. 
Opinion, Cal.App., 78 Cal.Rptr. 
vacated. 
I. Judgment e=>403 
823, 
Under certain circumstances, court 
sitting in equity can set aside or modify 
a valid final judgment. 
2. Judgment €=I03 
Power of court sitting in equity to 
set aside or modify valid final judgment can 
only be exercised when circumstances of 
case are sufficient to overcome strong 
public policy favoring finality of judg-
ments. 
3. Divorce <€=255 
Interlocutory divorce decrees are res 
judicata as to all questions determined 
therein, including property rights of par-
ties. 
4. Divorce €=>255 
If property settlement is incorporated 
in 'divorce decree, settlement is merged 
with decree and becomes final judicial de-
tern:tination of property rights of parties. 
5. Divorce ¢;;>246, 254 
Rules governing extrinsic fraud and 
mistake apply to alimony awards and prop-
erty settlements incorporated in divorce 
decrees. 
6. Judgment €=I43(I) 
"Extrinsic fraud" as basis for set-
ting' aside former judgment or decree 
arises when party is denied fair 'adversary 
hearing because he has been deliberately 
kept from knowing of the action or has 
been fraudulently prevented from present-
ing his claim or defense. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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7. Judgment e=>435, 443(1) 
Judgment will not be set aside on 
basis of extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mis-
take if party has been given notice of ac-
tion, has not been prevented from partici-
pating therein and has had opportunity to 
present his case to court to protect himself 
from mistake or any fraud attempted by 
his adversary. 
8. Judgment 08=>435 
Mutual mistake is not sufficient to 
set aside a final judgment. 
9. Judgment 08=>540 
Principles of res judicata demand 
that parties present their entire case in 
one proceeding. 
10. Judgment _5, 443(1) 
Relief from judgment on ground of 
extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake will 
be denied when complaining party has 
contributed to the fraud or mistake giving 
rise' to the judgment. 
II. Judgment 08=>435, 443(1) 
Whether case involves intrinsic or ·ex-
trinsic fraud or mistake is not determined 
abstractly and it is necessary to examine 
facts in light of policy that party who 
failed to assemble all his evidence at trial 
should not be privileged to relitigate case 
as well as policy permitting party to seek 
relief from judgment entered in a pro-
ceeding in which he has been deprived of 
fair opportunity fully to present his case. 
12. Husband and Wife *"278(1) 
Duty of one spouse to fully disclose 
to other spouse the assets to be divided up~ 
on separation arises out of fiduciary rela-
tionship between the husband and wife. 
13. Divorce 08=>254 
Where both husband and wife knew 
of New Zealand assets but husband and 
his attorney chose not to investigate their 
taxability, although property settlement 
agreement expressly required husband to 
I. There was, no formal property settlement 
agreement. All provisions of the decree 
relating to the distribution of property 
hold wife harmless as to any monies due 
any taxing agency, husband was not en~ 
titled to have tax provision struck from 
decree on basis of mutual mistake when 
he subSequeritly received assessment for 
federal taxes on theretofore undisclosed in~ 
come accumulated during marriage by New 
Zealand corporation in wife's name. 
James Martin MacInnis, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Goth, Dennis & Aaron and James M. 
Dennis, Redwood City, for defendant and 
respondent. 
. TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the 
Superior Court of San Mateo County modi-
fying an int~rlocutory decree of divorce 
to relieve defendant of liability to pay 
federal income taxes assessed against the 
parties on income accruing to plaintiff in 
New Zealand. 
Plaintiff secured an interlocutory decree 
of divorce from defendant on July 3, 1964. 
The decree included the disposition of the 
community and separate property of the 
parties.1 The decree provided, in part: 
"Oefendant shall indemnify and hold 
plaintiff free and harmless in the matter of 
any monies due any taxing agency, wheth-
er Federal, State or County, for the calen-
dar years prior to 1964." 
In 1966, following the divorce proceed-
ings defendant received a tax assessment 
of approximately $22,000 for federal in-
come' taxes based on theretofore undis-
closed' income accumulated during the mar~ 
riagoe by a New Zealand corporation in 
plaintiff's name. Defendant moved to mod~ 
ify the divorce decree to relieve him of any 
liability for taxes on the New Zealand in~ 
come ;on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and 
extririsic mistake., After a hearing on de~ 
fendant's motion, the trial court concluded 
that the tax provision in the decree "was 
were submitted to the court on the stip-
ulation of the parties. 
EULOHAR. v.EULOHAR. Cal. 19 
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included and approved by the parties as a 2d 171.) Thus, the rules governing 
result of the mutual mistake of the. parties extrinsic fraud and mistake apply to 
and further, that there was no intent of the alimony' awards and property -settlements 
parties that defendant should pay United incorporated in divorce decrees. (Jorgensen 
States Federal income tax resulting from v. Jotgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 18-23, 
income to plaintiff in New Zealand." The 193 P.2d 728; Cameron v. Cameron (1948) 
court struck the tax provision from the 88 Cal.App.2d 585, 595-597, 199 P.2d 443; 
decree "because of the mutual mistake of Hosner v. Skelly (1946} 72 Cal.App.2d 457, 
the parties." 461, 164 P.2d 573; Horton v. Horton 
[1,2] Under certain drcumstaJ'l,ces a 
court, sitting in equity; can set aside or 
modify a valid final judgment. (Olivera v. 
Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575-576, 122 
P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328; Caldwell v. 
Taylor (1933) 218 Cal. 471, 475, 23P.2d 
.758, 88 A.L.R. 1194.) This power, how-
ever, can only be exercised when the cir-
cumstances of the case are sufficient to 
overcome the strong policy favoring the 
finality of judgments. "A basic require-
ment of an action which can lead to a valid 
judgment is that a procedure 'should be 
adopted which in the normal case will give 
to the parties- an opportunity for a fair 
trial which is reasonable in view of the 
requirements of public policy in the 
particular 'type of case. If this require-
ment is met, a judgment awarded in an 
action is not void merely because the 
particular" individual against whom it was 
rendered did not in fact -have an opportunity 
to present his claim or defense before an 
impartial tribunal. • •.• [Plublic policy 
requires that only in -exceptional circum-
stances should the consequences of res 
judicata be denied to a valid judgu,ent." 
(Rest., Judgments, § 118, c~m. a.) 
[3-5] Interlocutory divorce decree are 
res judicata as to all questions determined 
therein, including the property rights of the 
parties. (In re Williams' Estate (1950) 36 
Ca1.2d 289, 292, 223 P.2d 248, 22 A.L.R.2d 
716; Adamson v. Adamson (1962) 209 Cal. 
App.2d 492, SOl, 26 Cal.Rptr. 236.) If a 
property settlement is incorporated in the 
divorce decree, the settlement is merged 
with the decree and becomes_ the final 
judicial determination of ,the property 
rights of the parties. (Broome v. Broome 
(1951) 104 Cal:App.2d 148, 154-155,231 P. 
(1941) 18 Cal.2d 579, 584-585, 116 P.2d 605; 
Hendricks v. Hendricks (1932) 216 Cal. 321, 
323-324, 14 P.2d 83; Godfrey v. Godfrey 
(1939) 30 Cal.App.2d 370, 378-380, 86 P.2d 
357; Smith v. Smith (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 
154, 161,-164,270 P.2d 613.) 
[6] Extrinsic fraud usually arises when 
a party "is denied a f~ir adversary hearing 
because he has been Hdeliberately kept in 
ignorance of the" action or proceeding, or 
in some other way fraudulently prevented 
from presenting _his claim or defense." (3 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 2124.) "Where 
the unsuccessful party has been prevented 
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or 
deception practiced on him by his opponent, 
as by keeping him away from court, a false 
promise of a - corp.promise; or where the 
defendant never had knowledge of the suit, 
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the 
plaintiff; or where an 'attorney fraudu-
lently or' without authority assumes to 
represent a party and connives at his 
defeat; or where the attorney regularly 
employed corruptly sells out his client's 
interest to' the other side,-these, and 
similar cases which ·show that there has 
never been a real contest in the trial or 
hearing of the case, are reasons for which 
a new suit may be sustained to set aside 
and annul the former judgment or decree, 
and open the case for a new and a fait 
hearing." (United States v. Throckmorton 
(1878) 98 U.S. 61, 65-66, 25 L.Ed. 93.) 
The right to' relief has also been extended 
to" cases involving extnnslC mistake. 
(Bacon v. Bacon (1907) 150 Cal. 477, 491-
492, 89 P. 317; Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19 
Cal.2d at p. 577, 122 P.2d 564.) "In some 
cases * * * the ground of relief is not 
so much the fraud or other misconduct of 
20 Cal. 462 PACIFIC REPORTER,2d SERIES 
the defendant as it is the excusable neglect 
of the plaintiff to appear and present his 
claim or defense. If such neglect results 
in an unjust judgment, without a fair 
adversary hea,.ing~ the basis for equitable 
relief is present, and is often -called 
'extrinsic mistake.'" (3 Witkin, Ca1.Proce-
dure, p. 2128.) 
Extrinsic mistake is found when a party 
becomes incompetent but no guardian ad 
litem is appointed (Olivera v. Grace, supra, 
19 Cal.2d at p. 577, 122 P.2d 564; Dei Tos 
v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 84-
85, 232 P.2d 873; Winslow v. McCarthy 
(1918) 39 Ca1.App. 337, 340, 178 P. 720); 
when one party relies on another to defend 
(Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Ca1.2d 849, 
855-856, 48 Ca1.Rptr. 620, 409 P.2d 700; 
Roussey v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. (1967) 
251 Cal.App.2d 251, 256, 59 Ca1.Rptr. 399); 
when there is reliance on an attorney who 
becomes incapacitated to act (Jeffords v. 
Young (1929) 98 Cal.App. 400, 405-406, 
277 P. 163; Smith v. Busniewski (1952) 
115 Cal.App.2d 124, 127-128, 251 P.2d 697; 
Antonsen v. Pacific Container Co. (1941) 
48 CaI.App.2d 535, 538, 120 P.2d 148); 
when a mistake led a court to do what it 
never intended· (Sullivan v. Lumsden 
(1897) 118 Cal. 664,669, SO P. 777; Bacon 
v. Bacon, supra, 150 Cal. at pp. 492-493, 89 
P. 317); when a mistaken belief of one 
party prevented proper notice of the action 
(Aldabe v. Aldabe (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 
453, 475, 26 Ca1.Rptr. 208; Boyle v. Boyle 
(1929) 97 CaI.App. 703, 706, 276 P. 118); 
or when the complaining party was disabled 
at the time the judgment was entered 
(Watson v. Watson (1958) 161 CaI.App.2d 
35, 39-40, 235 P.2dlO11; Saunders v. 
Saunders (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73, 
320 P.2d 131; Evry v. Tremble (1957) 154 
Cal.App.2d 444, 447-449, 316 P.2d 49). 
Relief has also been extended to cases' 
involving negligence of a party's attorney 
2. The decisions in both Hallett and BM-
tell have been criticized. (See Com-
ment (1943) 31 Cal.L.Rev. 600.) "The 
cases on intrinsic fraud, involving per-
jury, false documents and other repre-
hensible conduct by the adverse party, 
are far more compelling, yet relief is 
in not properly filing an answer (Hallett v. 
Slaughter (1943) 22 Cal.2d 552, 556-557, 140 
P.2d 3; Turner v. Allen (1961) 189 Cal. 
App.2d 753, 757-760, 11 Cal.Rptr. 630); and 
mistaken belief as to immunity from suit 
(Bartell v. Johnson (1943) 60 CaI.App.2d 
432, 436-437, 140 P.2d 878).-
. [7-9] Relief is denied, however, if a 
party has been given notice of an action 
and has not been prevented from partici-
pating therein. He has had an opportunity 
to pres~nt his case to the court and to pro-
tect himself from mistake or from any 
fraud attempted by his adversary. (Jor-
gensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13 
at p. 18, 193 P.2d 728; Westphal v. West-. 
phal (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 393, 397, 126 P.2d 
105; Gale v. Witt (1948) 31 Cal.2d 362, 
367, .188 P.2d 755.) Moreover, a mutual 
mistake that might be sufficient to set 
aside a contract is not sufficient to set 
aside .. final judgment. The principles of 
res judicata demand that the parties pre-
sent their entire case in one proceeding. 
"Public policy requires that pressure be 
brought upon litigants to use great care 
in preparing cases for trial and in ascer-
taining all the facts. A rule which would 
permit the re-opening of cases previously 
decided because of error or ignorance 
during the progress of the trial would in 
a large measure vitiate the effects of the 
rules of res judicata." (Rest., Judgments, 
§ 126, com. a.) Courts deny relief, there-
fore, when the fraud or mistake is "in-
trinsic" ; that is, when it "goes to the 
merits of the prior proceedings, which 
should have been guarded against by the 
plaintiff at that time'" (Comment, Equi-
table Relief From Judgments, Orders and 
Decrees Obtained by Fraud (1934) 23 Cal. 
L.Rev. 79, 83-84; see Pico v. Cohn (1891) 
91 Cal. 129, 134, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537, 13 
L.R.A. . 3j6; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
supra, 216 Cal. at pp. 323-324, 14 P.2d 83.) 
uniformly denied for good reason. 
• • • The Hallett and Bartell caSes 
involved no true extrinsic factors in the 
accepted sense, and they raise serious 
questions as to the practical finality of 
any default judgment." (3 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure, p. 2130.) 
JroLOllAR v. JroLOlIAR Cal. 21 
Cite a8 f62 P.2d 17 
[10] Relief is also denied when the when preparing income tax returns, an 
complaining party has contributed to the attorney, who later represented defendant 
fraud or mistake -giving rise to the judg- in the divorce action, made some inquiry 
ment thus obtained. (Hammell' v. Britton into the nature of the New Zealand income 
(1941) 19 Cal.2d 72, SO, 119 P.2d 333; at the request of defendant. The attorney 
Rudy v. Siotwinsky (1925) 73 Cal.App. abandoned further investigation after 
459, 465, 238 P. 783; Rest., Judgments, § plaintiff stated that a law firm known to 
129.) "If the complainant was guilty of defendant's attorney had advised her that 
negligence in permitting the fraud to be the New Zealand income was not taxable. 
practiced on the mistake to occur equity The attorney knew that the New Zealand 
will deny relief." Wilson v. :Wilson holdings were "sizable." Both parties 
(1942) 55 CalApp2d 421, 427, 130 P 2d testified that the tax provision was included 
782, 785.) in the decree because of an audit being 
[11] Whether the case involves .in-
trinsic or extrinsic fraud or mistake is 
not determined abstractly. "It is neces-
sary to examine 'the facts in the light of 
the policy that a party who failed to as-
semble all his evidence at the trial should 
not be privileged to relitigate a case, as 
well as the policy permitting a party to 
seek relief from a judgment entered in a 
proceeding in which he was deprived of a 
fair opportunity fully to present his case." 
(Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra,' 32 Cal.2d 
13 at p. 19, 193 P.2d 728, at p. 732.) 
The evidence in the present case es-
tablishes that it is a case in which a party 
"failed to assemble all his evidence at the 
trial." Defendant testified that he knew 
of the New Zealand holdings prior; to the 
divorce and that _pla~ntiff ,w~s rece;:iving 
$640 every four months' from New Zea-
land. In defendant1s divor~e questionnaire, 
circulated _to determine the' extent of mari-
tp.l property holdings, expenses and in-
come, he listed as plaintiff's separate prop-
erty "50% stock interest in David Lloyd 
Co., Ltd.,-a New Zealand holding cor-, 
poration for many subsidiary companies 
(cement, coal, paper)-exact worth un~ 
known to defendant-estimated to run in-
to millions of dollars." In a letter sent by 
defendant's attorney to plaintiff's attorney 
in which the principal points of the prop-
erty settlement were summarized, defend-
ant proposed to transfer to plaintiff "any 
interest he may .have in her holdings in 
New Zealand." Plaintiff also knew. of 
the holdings but did not know of their 
value or their tax consequences. In 1957 
conducted by the Internal Revenue Service 
with respect to an unrelated transaction by 
defendant. 
[12] Clearly. the present case does not 
involve the failure of one spouse to dis-
close· fully the assets to be divided upon 
separation. (See Taylor v. Taylor (1923) 
192 Cal. 71, 218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074; 
Milekovich v. Quinn (1919) 40 Cal.App. 
537, 181 P. 256.) The duty to disclose 
arises out of the fiduciary relationship 
between the husband and wife. (Vai v. 
Bank of America (1961) 56 Cal.2d 329, 
337-340, 15 Cal.Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 247; 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Ca1.2d 
13 at pp. 19--21, '193 P.2d 728.) There is 
no evidence that the wife withheld any in-
formation relevant to the nature of her 
New Zealand ~ncoJlle., 
The factual situation in -the present 
case is analogous to that in Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, supra. In Jorgensen the hus-
band disclosed. alI known assets of the 
parties. The husband claimed certain as-
sets as his separate property. The wife 
and her attorney _accepted the husband's 
statements at face value without. any in-
dependent investigation. Subsequent to 
the divorce decree, however J they' learned 
that some of the assets the husband claimed 
as separate property were actually com-
munity property, in which the wife was en-
titled to a one-half interest. The wife was 
denied the right to set aside the property 
settlement agreement. "If the wife and 
her attorney are satisfied with the hus-
band's classification of the property as 
separate or community, the. wife cannot 
22 Cal. 462 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
reasonably contend that fraud was com· 
mitted or that there was such mistake as 
to allow her to overcome the finality of a 
judgment. * * * Plaintiff is barred 
from obtaining equitable relief by her ad-
mission that she and her attorney did not 
investigate the facts, choosing instead to 
rely on the statements of the husband as 
to' what part of the disclosed property was 
community property." (Jorgensen v. Jor-
gensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13 at pp. 22-23, 193 
P.2d 728, at p. 734; see also, Cameron 
v. Cameron, supra, 88 Cal.App.2d 585 at 
pp. 595-597, 199 P.2d 443 wherein the hold-
ing of Jorgensen was found controlling.) 
[13] In the present case both parties 
knew of the New Zealand assets, but the 
husband and his attorney chose not to in-
vestigate their taxabiHty. The property 
settlement agreement expressly covered un-
known tax liability. Having had full op-
portunity to consider all income of the wife 
and its concurrent tax consequences, the 
husband cannot now complain of the added 
tax burden. 
The order is reversed. 
PETERS, 
BURKE; and 
TOBRINER, MOSK, 
SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. 
McCOMB, Justice. 
I dissent. I would affirm the order of 
the trial court. 
o ! m~,:::u.::"::'''mTIM='' 
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The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Re.pondent, 
v. 
R.f •• WILSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
Cr. 12163. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Dec. 18. 1969. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1970. 
The defendant was convicted of first:-
and second-degree murder and of assault 
with deadly' weapon. The Superior Court, 
Los Angeles County, Mark Brandler, J., 
rendered judgment, and defendant's ap-
peal was automatic. The Supreme Court, 
Mosk, J., held that the giving of felony-
murder instruction permitting jurors to find 
defendant guilty of second-degree murder 
if they found only that homicide was com-
mitted in perpetration of crime of assault 
with deadly weapon was prejudicial error 
in that it permitted conviction for second-
degree murder without a finding of essen-
tial element of malice aforethought. The 
Court further held that the giving of 
felony-murder instructions to effect that if 
defendant entered his wife's apartment or 
any room thereof with intent to commit an 
assault with a deadly weapon he was guilty 
of burglary, and if in course of such bur-
glary he killed his wife and/or her male 
guest, such killing was first-degree mur-
der, whether it was .intentional, negligent, 
or accidental was reversible error. 
Judgment convicting defendant of 
first- and second-degree murder reversed 
and judgment affirmed insofar as it con-
victed him of assault with deadly weapon. 
McComb, ]., dissented. 
I. Homicide 0$=>289,,340(1) 
The giving of felony-murder instruc-
tion permitting jurors to find defendant 
guilty of second-degree murder if they 
found only that homicide was committed 
in perpetration of crime of assault with 
deadly weapon was prejudicial error in that 
it permitted conviction for second-degree 
murder without a finding of essential ele-
ment of malice aforethought. 
2. HomiCide e:>289, 340(1) 
The giving of felony-murder instruc-
tions to effect that if defendant entered 
his wife's apartment or any room thereof 
with intent to commit an assault with a 
deadly weapon he was guilty of burglary, 
and if in course of such burglary he killed 
his wife and/or her male guest, such killing 
was first-degree murder, whether it was 
intentional, negligent, or accidental was re-
versible error; overruling People v. Hamil-
